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In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the consequences of 
conspiracy theories and the COVID–19 pandemic raised this interest to another level. In 
this article, I will outline what we know about the consequences of conspiracy theories 
for individuals, groups, and society, arguing that they are certainly not harmless. In 
particular, research suggests that conspiracy theories are associated with political apathy, 
support for non-normative political action, climate denial, vaccine refusal, prejudice, 
crime, violence, disengagement in the workplace, and reluctance to adhere to COVID–19 
recommendations. In this article, I will also discuss the challenges of dealing with the 
negative consequences of conspiracy theories, which present some opportunities for 
future research.  
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In March 2020, the world was faced with the reality of a global pandemic, and 
almost as soon as the news started to emerge about COVID–19, so did the conspiracy 
theories. Was the virus a hoax to control the general public? Was it a Chinese bioweapon 
designed to wage war on the U.S.? Did 5G phone masts spread the virus? To those of us 
who study the psychology of conspiracy theories, the emergence of new conspiracy 
theories at this time did not come as a huge surprise. Indeed, conspiracy theories have 
always tended to surface in times of crisis and unrest (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). 
However, conspiracy theories like these are not harmless—instead, they bring with them 
significant and damaging consequences. In this article, I will summarize what we know 
so far about the consequences of conspiracy theories, and will also outline some 
challenges for dealing with them. 
<H2> Why People Believe in Conspiracy Theories 
Conspiracy theories explain significant events and circumstances as the secret and 
malicious acts of powerful groups (Douglas et al., 2019). Research on the psychology of 
conspiracy theories has grown significantly in the past 15 years, focusing predominantly 
on why some people are inclined toward conspiracy theories while others are not. This 
literature suggests that people are drawn to conspiracy theories in an attempt to satisfy 
important psychological needs (Douglas et al., 2017).  
The first of these—epistemic—relates to the needs for knowledge and clarity. For 
example, when people feel uncertain they are more drawn to conspiracy theories (van 
Prooijen & Jostman, 2013), and conspiracy theories seem to appeal more to people who 
show a tendency to look for patterns and meaning in chaos (van Prooijen et al., 2018). 
The second set of needs—existential—refer to the needs people have to feel safe, secure, 
and in control. For example, people tend to believe conspiracy theories more when they 
are anxious (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013) and when they feel powerless (Abalakina-Paap et 
al., 1999). Finally people have social needs to feel good about themselves and the groups 
to which they belong, and these needs also seem to lead people toward conspiracy 
theories. For example, people who want to feel unique compared to others are more likely 
to believe in conspiracy theories (Lantian et al., 2017), as are people who feel that a social 
group to which they belong is important but underappreciated by others (Cichocka et al., 
2016).  
<H2> Consequences of Conspiracy Theories 
While there is growing consensus among researchers regarding the psychological 
underpinnings of conspiracy beliefs, the consequences of conspiracy theories are less well 
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understood. Some theorists argue that there may be positive outcomes. Specifically, 
conspiracy theories may provide a sense of community for people with marginal views 
(Franks et al., 2017). They may also open up opportunities for political debate (Miller, 
2002), increase accountability (Basham, 2003; Dentith, 2016), encourage greater 
transparency (Swami & Coles, 2010) and inspire people to mobilize toward collective 
goals with the intention to bring about social change (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Mari et al., 
2017). Some scholars view conspiracy theories as a result of people’s attempts to 
understand social and political reality (Knight, 2001; Radnitz & Underwood, 2017), and 
therefore as an important ingredient of democratic discourse (Moore, 2016).  
However, so far the positive outcomes of conspiracy theorizing seem to be heavily 
outweighed by the negative psychological and societal consequences which have been 
studied more comprehensively in psychology and other social sciences. In the following 
sections, I will outline what we know so far about these consequences.  
<H3> Attitudes and Attitude Change 
In one of the first investigations of the consequences of conspiracy theories, Butler 
et al. (1995) found that they are persuasive. Butler et al. asked participants who had just 
viewed the Oliver Stone film JFK—which presented a conspiracy narrative about the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy—to rate their agreement with the conspiracy 
story. Compared to participants who had not yet viewed the film, those exiting the cinema 
agreed significantly more with the conspiracy story. Douglas and Sutton (2008) found 
similar results with respect to conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana. 
Specifically, people who read conspiracy theories about her death agreed more that the 
event was due to a conspiracy. Douglas and Sutton further demonstrated that people were 
not aware that their attitudes had changed as a result of reading the conspiracy theories. 
These attitude change effects may depend on people’s pre-existing attitudes. For 
example, Uscinski et al. (2016) included the word “conspiracy” in a survey about media 
coverage during the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Half of the surveys included this 
word and the other half did not. Uscinski and colleagues found that the inclusion of the 
word “conspiracy” only influenced people who had also scored high in a general tendency 
toward conspiracy thinking. Overall, these findings suggest that conspiracy theories can 
have a significant impact on people’s attitudes, and even more so if people are already 
inclined to believe in conspiracy theories. In online environments where “echo chambers” 
of conspiracy believers are almost exclusively exposed to conspiracy content, attitudes 
can become more polarized and extreme (del Vicario et al., 2016; Bessi et al., 2015).  
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<H3> Politics, Extremism, Crime, and Violence 
A number of studies suggest that conspiracy theories have consequences for 
people’s political intentions. Jolley and Douglas (2014a) found that people who were 
asked to read anti-government conspiracy theories were less inclined to vote in the next 
election, compared to participants who had been given information refuting those 
conspiracy theories. Butler et al (1995) also showed that people were less likely to want 
to engage in politics after watching the film JFK. After reading conspiracy theories, 
people also tend to indicate that their trust in politics has diminished (Einstein & Glick, 
2013). Furthermore, people who show a general tendency toward conspiracy theories are 
less inclined to register to vote, donate to a political campaign, or display political signs 
outside their homes (Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  
Aside from this political apathy however, conspiracy theories may sometimes be 
associated with radicalized and extremist activities. Indeed, they have been linked to non-
normative political actions such as protests (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) and illegal actions 
such as occupying buildings (Mari et al., 2017). Bartlett and Miller (2010) found that 
conspiracy theorizing was prevalent in online extremist groups, both for extreme right- 
and extreme left-wing groups. Conspiracy theories may therefore be a “radicalizing 
multiplier” (p. 4) that serves to reinforce ideologies and psychological processes within 
extremist groups. Recently, Rottweiler and Gill (2020) found a link between conspiracy 
beliefs and violent extremist intentions. Specifically, these relationships were stronger for 
individuals who have low self-control, have weaker morality when it comes to the law, 
but score higher in self-efficacy.  
More generally, conspiracy beliefs have been associated with intentions to engage 
in violence. Uscinski and Parent (2014) found that people who were more predisposed to 
conspiracy theories were more likely than others to agree that “violence is sometimes an 
acceptable way to express disagreement with the government”. People inclined toward 
conspiracy theories also show a greater willingness to conspire themselves (Douglas & 
Sutton, 2011), more relaxed attitudes towards gun ownership (Uscinski & Parent, 2014) 
and are more likely to engage in everyday small crimes such as running red traffic lights 
and paying for goods with cash to avoid taxation (Jolley et al., 2019).  
<H3> Prejudice, Discrimination, and Intergroup Relations 
Conspiracy theories are also associated with negative attitudes towards outgroups. 
In one study, Swami (2012) asked Malaysian participants to indicate their belief in 
conspiracy theories generally, their belief in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories (e.g., that 
6 
Jews are trying to establish a secret world government), and attitudes towards Israelis 
amongst other ideological attitudes. Belief in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories was 
associated with anti-Israeli attitudes but also racism towards Chinese people. In 
experimental studies, Jolley et al. (2020) found that exposure to anti-Jewish conspiracy 
theories predicted prejudice and discrimination toward Jews, but also prejudice toward 
groups who were not part of the alleged conspiracy, such as Americans, Asians, and 
Arabs. Overall, this research suggests that conspiracy theories may have damaging and 
broad implications for intergroup relations.  
Other research has linked anti-Jewish conspiracy beliefs to anti-Semitic attitudes 
generally (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012) and discrimination toward Jews (Bilewicz 
et al., 2013). These beliefs appear to be largely driven by feelings of political 
uncontrollability (Kofta et al., 2020). Imhoff and Bruder (2014) also showed that a 
tendency toward conspiracy theorizing was associated with prejudice towards high-power 
groups such as Jews and Americans. Conspiracy theories may therefore reinforce an “us” 
versus “them” dichotomy, further reinforcing tensions between groups.  
<H3> Climate Attitudes and Science Denialism 
Climate denial is prominent in the U.S. (Uscinski et al., 2017) and is linked to 
conspiracy beliefs such as the idea that climate change is a hoax fabricated by climate 
scientists to win research funding (Douglas & Sutton, 2015). Jolley and Douglas (2014b) 
showed that these conspiracy theories negatively influence people’s intentions to become 
more energy efficient and reduce their carbon footprint. Specifically, people who read 
about climate change conspiracy theories felt powerless, uncertain, and disillusioned, and 
were in turn less inclined to take climate action. Another study has shown that climate 
change conspiracy theories also reduce intentions to sign a petition to help reduce the 
impact of global warming (van der Linden, 2015).  
A significant number of studies have shown that conspiracy theories about climate 
change go hand in hand with science denial more generally (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 
2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Uscinski et al., 2017). Many other conspiracy theories 
express mistrust in science and rejection of scientific findings. For example, conspiracy 
beliefs have been linked to negative attitudes about genetically modified food, 
vaccination, the origins of the AIDS virus, forensic evidence about the 9/11 attacks, and 
beliefs about the origins of COVID–19 (see also Rutjens et al., 2017).  
<H3> Health Choices 
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Several studies have also linked belief in conspiracy theories to risky healthy 
choices. For example, conspiracy beliefs alleging that birth control is a form of genocide 
against Africans and African Americans are associated with more negative attitudes 
towards contraception in the U.S. (e.g., Thorburn Bird & Bogart, 2003; Thorburn & 
Bogart, 2005). Perceived discrimination against African Americans also plays a role in 
the rejection of contraception (e.g., Bogart & Thorburn Bird, 2003), and similar findings 
have been found in South Africa where these conspiracy theories are also popular (Grebe 
& Natrass, 2012).   
Oliver and Wood (2014) found in U.S. nationally representative samples that over 
half of the population believes in one health-related conspiracy theory (e.g., that mobile 
phones cause cancer but this fact is hidden by health officials). They further found that 
believers were less likely to trust medical professionals and were more likely to look 
elsewhere (e.g., alternative medicines) for treatment (see also Lamberty & Imhoff, 2018). 
Experimental research has shown that anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs significantly 
decrease people’s intentions to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b), and qualitative 
research exploring people’s vaccination decisions has found that conspiracy theories play 
a significant role in these decisions (Craciun & Baban, 2012; Khan & Sahibzada, 2016).  
<H3> Work Choices 
Furthermore, a small number of studies have examined the consequences of 
conspiracy beliefs in the workplace. van Prooijen and de Vries (2016) found that 
believing that conspiracies happen in the workplace was associated with increased 
turnover intentions due to reduced organizational commitment. In experimental studies, 
Douglas and Leite (2017) found that participants who were asked to imagine a 
conspiratorial workplace were more likely to want to leave the workplace compared to 
participants in a control condition. This effect was driven by lower feelings of 
commitment to the workplace, and lower job satisfaction. Others have argued that rumors 
and gossip may be detrimental to the workplace (DiFonzo et al., 1994), and research 
suggests that conspiracy theories at work may also be more than just trivial ideas shared 
during break times. 
<H3> COVID–19 Conspiracy Theories 
Finally, recent research has examined some of the consequences of believing in 
conspiracy theories about COVID–19. In particular, this research has shown that belief 
in these conspiracy theories has negative consequences for people’s intentions to comply 
with government recommendations to reduce the spread of the virus. For example, Romer 
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and Jamieson (2020) found that belief in COVID–19 conspiracy theories in the U.S. was 
associated with lower perceived threat of the pandemic, less likelihood of taking 
preventive action (e.g., wearing a mask), and refusal of a vaccine if one became available. 
Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) found that “hoax” conspiracy theories in particular predicted 
refusal of preventive behaviors, but conspiracy beliefs that the virus is a bioweapon were 
associated with more self-centered prepping behavior. Furthermore, Biddlestone et al. 
(2020) demonstrated that people with an individualist (versus collectivist) mindset were 
less likely to engage in COVID–19 preventive behaviors, a relationship mediated by 
belief in COVID–19 conspiracy theories.  
Other negative consequences of COVID–19 conspiracy theories include 
willingness to engage in vandalism of 5G phone masts and violence more generally 
(Jolley & Paterson, 2020), and a large number of unpublished preprints available on 
psycharxiv.com suggest that belief in COVID–19 conspiracy theories is also associated 
with outcomes such as support for alternative remedies, and stockpiling. Like many other 
types of conspiracy theories, COVID–19 conspiracy theories therefore also appear to do 
harm.  
<H2> Dealing with Conspiracy Theories: Practical Solutions and Future Research 
Research suggests that it is difficult to address the consequences of conspiracy 
theories because such theories are so nebulous and are often unfalsifiable, making them 
difficult to tackle head on (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2012). People who believe in 
conspiracy theories are also typically very committed to their beliefs, which are often 
driven by political attitudes and beliefs associated with important group memberships 
(Uscinski et al., 2016). Such ties are hard to break. However, as we have seen in the case 
of COVID–19 conspiracy theories, promoting a collectivist mindset may help people 
resist the temptation of conspiracy theories (Biddlestone et al., 2020). Promoting a more 
collectivist mindset may therefore also be a way in general to break the negative 
consequences that “us” versus “them” conspiracy theorizing can bring.  
Another challenge in dealing with conspiracy theories is that when trusted and 
influential sources of information argue in favor of conspiracy theories, potentially 
damaging ideas can gain traction. People may be reluctant to accept counterarguments 
from governments or other official sources who are typically viewed as “outgroups”. 
However, one option for dealing with conspiracy theories might be to use trusted 
influential messengers to present counterarguments. In other words, combating 
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conspiracy theories is likely to be more successful if the counterarguments come from 
people who are trusted, such as valued ingroup members (Nisbet, 2009).  
Another possibility for dealing with conspiracy theories uses a similar idea to the 
principle of inoculation in vaccinations. Specifically, “inoculating” people with factual 
information can curtail the impact of conspiracy theories. For example, Jolley and 
Douglas (2017) showed that for anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, pro-vaccine 
counterarguments were effective in improving intentions to vaccinate if presented prior 
to the conspiracy theories. However, once the conspiracy theories had already been 
presented, they were difficult to counter with pro-vaccine arguments. A related strategy 
may be to present people with pre-exposure warnings to let people know that there is a 
possibility that future information is intended to mislead them (Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). Serious games using similar techniques have already been shown to effectively 
reduce the impact of misinformation more generally (Maertens et al., 2020).  
Finally, earlier in this article I wrote about the psychological needs that draw 
people toward conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2017). A broader and longer-term 
strategy for dealing with conspiracy theories might be to attempt to address these 
psychological needs directly. To do so, a more nuanced understanding of how these needs 
fluctuate over time and with changing political and social circumstances may be needed. 
However, focusing on people’s psychological needs and attempting to address those 
needs by means other than conspiracy theories might make conspiracy theories less 
appealing. They might also improve people’s day to day wellbeing.  
<H2> Conclusions 
Conspiracy theories are associated with a range of negative consequences for 
political engagement, political behavior, climate engagement, trust in science, vaccine 
uptake, civic behavior, work-related behavior, intergroup relations, and more recently the 
COVID–19 response. A significant challenge for researchers is to learn how to deal with 
conspiracy theories and their associated effects. 
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